Director tenure and independent audit committee effectiveness by Liu, Guoping & Sun, Jerry
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
Odette School of Business Publications Odette School of Business
2010
Director tenure and independent audit committee
effectiveness
Guoping Liu
Ryerson University
Jerry Sun
University of Windsor
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/odettepub
Part of the Business Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Odette School of Business at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Odette School of Business Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact
scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Recommended Citation
Liu, Guoping and Sun, Jerry. (2010). Director tenure and independent audit committee effectiveness. International Research Journal of
Finance and Economics, 51.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/odettepub/9
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 
ISSN 1450-2887 Issue 51 (2010) 
© EuroJournals Publishing, Inc. 2010 
http://www.eurojournals.com/finance.htm 
 
Director Tenure and Independent Audit Committee 
Effectiveness 
 
 
Guoping Liu 
Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5B 2K3 
E-mail: gliu@ryerson.ca 
Tel: +1-416-9795000; Fax: +1-416-9795266 
 
Jerry Sun 
Odette School of Business, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9B 3P4 
E-mail: jyksun@uwindsor.ca 
Tel: +1-519-2533000; Fax: +1-519-9737073 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines whether board tenure of directors on the independent audit 
committee affects the effectiveness of the committee in oversight of financial reporting. 
Using a larger size sample of 7,700 firm-year observations over the period 1998 to 2005 in 
U.S., we document strong evidence that the proportion of long tenure directors on the 
independent audit committee is negatively associated with earnings management. The 
results are robust to several sensitivity analyses. Our findings further corroborate the notion 
that long tenure directors have greater expertise and experience to effectively monitor 
financial reporting process. 
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1.  Introduction 
Audit committees play an important monitoring role in companies’ financial reporting process. Klein 
(2002a) finds that higher proportion of outside directors on the audit committee (i.e., audit committee 
independence) is associated with lower earnings management, suggesting that audit committee 
independence reflects governance quality. However, this quality measure has become less practical in 
U.S. since U.S. stock exchanges required that listed firms must have audit committees consisting solely 
of outside directors (NYSE Corporate Governance 303A.05, NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and AMEX 
Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules Sec 805). Moreover, directors may still differ in their 
monitoring effectiveness even though they are all “outside” or “independent” directors. Thus, it is of 
practical value to explore the quality difference between fully independent audit committees. 
In addition to directors’ independence, Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) suggest that 
audit committee members’ other characteristics may affect audit committee effectiveness. They argue 
that director board tenure may reflect monitoring effectiveness. On the one hand, directors with long 
board tenure have greater knowledge and experience, thus resulting in higher monitoring effectiveness. 
On the other hand, long tenure directors may be less effective because they are more likely to befriend 
managers and are less likely to adequately monitor managers (Vafeas, 2003). Bedard et al. (2004) 
examine whether audit committee members’ average board tenure is associated with earnings 
management. They document marginally significant evidence that earnings management is lower when 
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audit committee members have long board tenure. Since they use a small size sample of 300 firms in 
1996 and their evidence is marginally significant, further research into the relationship between 
director tenure and audit committee effectiveness is warranted. 
To shed more light on this issue, this study employs a large size sample of 7,700 firm-year 
observation over the period 1998 to 2005 in U.S. We provide strong evidence that earnings 
management is negatively associated with the proportion of long tenure directors on the independent 
audit committees. The results are robust to several additional analyses. Our findings are consistent with 
the notion that long tenure directors are more effective in oversight of financial reporting because of 
their greater expertise and experience. 
This study extends the research on the effect of director tenure on audit committee governance 
quality in the following two ways. First, we focus on independent audit committees. Unlike Bedard et 
al. (2004), our sample firms have a fully independent audit committee, which is practically important 
since audit committees of all U.S. firms have been required to be solely composed of independent 
directors. Second, we use a larger size sample compared to previous studies on audit committee 
effectiveness. Thus, our data analyses are more statistically powerful. Our evidence on the association 
between director tenure and audit committee effectiveness will be more convincing. Overall, this study 
contributes to the literature on audit committee effectiveness by providing more significant evidence 
on the monitoring quality of long tenure directors. Moreover, our findings provide a more explicit 
implication to corporate governance regulators that board tenure of independent directors may be 
considered when audit committee composition is regulated. 
 
 
2.  Prior Research 
The audit committee plays a key role in overseeing, monitoring, and advising the management and 
outside auditors in preparing financial statements, conducting audits, and implementing internal 
accounting control systems. Previous studies (e.g., Klein, 2002a) usually use the proportion of outside 
directors on the audit committee (i.e., audit committee independence) to measure the quality of the 
audit committee. Those studies suggest that the audit committee is more effective if more outside 
directors are sitting on the committee. 
Klein (2002a) examines whether audit committee independence is associated with earnings 
management. She finds that audit committee independence is negatively related to abnormal accruals, 
suggesting that audit committees structured to be more independent of the management are more 
effective in constraining earnings management. In addition to audit committee independence, Bedard et 
al. (2004) examine whether audit committee expertise affects earnings management. They measure 
audit committee expertise with respect to three aspects: financial, governance, and firm-specific 
expertise. Using a sample of 300 U.S. firms classified into three groups: one with aggressive income-
increasing earnings management, one with aggressive income-decreasing earnings management, and 
one with low levels of earnings management in the year 1996, they find that the financial and 
governance expertise of audit committee members are negatively associated with the likelihood of 
aggressive earnings management. Moreover, they find that audit committee independence is negatively 
related to the likelihood of aggressive earnings management. 
Prior research also investigates the association between audit committee characteristics and 
financial reporting quality not directly measured in earnings management. Abbott, Parker, and Peters 
(2004) examine the association of 88 financial restatements in the period 1991 to 1999 with audit 
committee characteristics. They find that the likelihood of financial restatement is less for firms with 
higher audit committee independence and more audit committee meetings. Farber (2005) explores 
audit committee characteristics of 87 firms identified by the SEC as fraudulently manipulating their 
financial statements. He finds that the fraud firms have lower audit committee expertise and fewer 
audit committee meetings compared to the control firms. 
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Previous studies also suggest that audit committee characteristics affect audit quality, thus 
enhancing financial reporting quality. Carcello and Neal (2000) examine the impact of audit committee 
quality on the issuance of auditors’ going concern reports. They find that the auditor is more likely to 
issue a going-concern report for firms experiencing financial distress if the firms have higher audit 
committee independence. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) investigate whether audit committee members’ 
experience and knowledge affect their judgements in auditor-corporate management conflict situations. 
They find that audit committee members with greater experience and greater accounting knowledge are 
more likely to support an auditor in disputes with the management. Abbott, Parker, Peters, and 
Raghunandan (2003) examine the association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees. 
They find that audit fees are positively associated with audit committee characteristics such as 
independence and financial expertise, suggesting that those characteristics can influence the level of 
audit coverage and thereafter audit quality. 
Moreover, there is extant research into the relationship between audit committee characteristics 
and corporate disclosure quality. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examine whether audit committee 
structures are related to the voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts. They find that 
managers are more likely to issue or update earnings forecasts when firms have more effective audit 
committee structures. Mangena and Pike (2005) examine whether audit committee characteristics 
affect the level of disclosure in interim reports of 262 U.K. listed companies. They find that audit 
committee financial expertise exerts a positive impact on the level of interim disclosure. 
In summary, prior research focuses on audit committee independence and financial expertise 
while investigating audit committee effectiveness. There is limited research on the relationship 
between audit committee members’ board tenure and audit committee effectiveness. 
 
 
3.  Hypotheses Development 
3.1. Effectiveness of Long Tenure 
There is a large body of research into the effect of work experience on job performance in the literature 
(Quinones, Ford, and Teachout, 1995). Experience is the job-relevant knowledge gained over time 
(Fiedler, 1970). Hunter and Hunter (1984) find a correlation of 0.18 between work experience and job 
performance based on a meta-analysis. Using path analysis, Schmidt, Hunter, and Outerbridge (1986) 
show that work experience plays an important role in predicting job performance. McDaniel, Schmidt, 
and Hunter (1988) document a mean corrected correlation of 0.32 between work experience and job 
performance across a number of occupations. Those studies suggest that work experience can improve 
job performance. In addition, time on the job or tenure is used to measure work experience in most 
studies (Quinones et al., 1995). 
Board directors should act in good faith in the interests of the company. Outside directors play 
an important role in monitoring the management as they are not affiliated with the company. They 
need to exercise the judgments on issues coming before the board or committee. Those issues include 
accounting treatments. Procedural knowledge means by the knowledge of the steps involved in actually 
performing a task, such as solving a particular type of problem or analyzing a particular issue. 
Since procedure knowledge is important in dealing with accounting issues (Herz and Schultz, 
1999), outside directors’ job performance of monitoring accounting and auditing will involve the 
acquisition of procedure knowledge. Procedural knowledge can be learned "on-the-job", and is more 
likely to increase as a result of work experience (Quinones et al., 1995). Thus, outside directors acquire 
the procedural knowledge through performing the task of monitoring financial reporting process over 
time. 
The effectiveness of the board or committee (including in particular the role played by outside 
directors) is dependent to a substantial content on the usefulness of the information that directors 
receive. Outside directors are less informed than inside directors (Bhagat and Black, 2002). Over time, 
outside directors can gain much knowledge of the company’s internal control system and business 
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operations. Furthermore, outside directors may also establish working relationships with the 
management and, through those relationships, acquire more useful information for their judgements on 
accounting issues. 
Long tenure directors may have high reputation developed over time. Those directors are likely 
to pay more attention to the job performance as the poor performance will dramatically impair their 
reputational capitals. In addition, directors who survive long tenure must perform well if the job market 
of directors is efficient (Vafeas, 2003). 
Previous studies (e.g., Salancik, 1977; O’Reilly and Caldwell, 1981) suggest that directors’ 
organizational commitment increases in tenure. Salancik (1977) develops a theory that people’s actions 
become more committing if the revocability of the actions is lower. Furthermore, O’Reilly and 
Caldwell (1981) provide evidence that behavioural commitment is significantly associated with job 
turnover. Long tenure directors may have high job satisfactions. Those directors are less likely to 
reverse their job acceptance. Thus, extended director tenure can enhance the commitment of directors 
to fulfil their duties. 
In summary, long tenure directors have greater experience, expertise, and reputation. Also, they 
have high commitment and willingness to work better. If an independent audit committee has more 
long tenure directors, the committee is more effective in constraining earnings management. Thus, we 
develop the following hypothesis: 
H1: Independent audit committees with more long tenure directors are more effective in 
constraining earnings management than those with fewer long tenure directors. 
 
3.2. Ineffectiveness of Long Tenure 
On the other hand, long board tenure may lead to the entrenchment that reduces the effectiveness of 
outside directors. Long tenure directors are more likely to have a friendly relationship with the 
management, which is developed over time (Vafeas, 2003). Studies by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker 
(2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) suggest that the management may use their power to influence 
the nomination process of directors. Outside directors with strong personal ties with the management 
are more likely to be re-appointed and survive long term. Those directors will cease to operate 
independently, as said by Richard Koppes, former general counsel of CalPERS, “It is easier for a 
longer-tenured director to begin to operate as an insider” (Canavan, Jones, and Potter, 2004). Thus, the 
independence of outside directors may decrease in board tenure. 
Long tenure directors are less mobile and less employable (Vafeas, 2003). They lack new 
insights and solutions to the company’s issues (Canavan et al., 2004). As business operations are 
becoming more complex and changing more rapidly, it is increasingly difficult for long tenure 
directors to keep abreast of changes to technology, financial dealings, and business strategies. New 
directors can bring fresh ideas and critical thinking to the board or committee. However, long tenure 
directors may lack talent to deal with new issues. 
Based on the above arguments, long tenure directors are likely to be ineffective. Whether the 
effectiveness of long tenure dominates its ineffectiveness is an empirical issue. Thus, we develop the 
following hypothesis opposite to H1: 
H2: Independent audit committees with more long tenure directors are less effective in 
constraining earnings management than those with fewer long tenure directors. 
 
 
4.  Research Design 
4.1. Sample Selection 
The sample selection begins by searching the version of IRRC Directors’ database updated in 
November 2006 for U.S. companies with audit committees consisting solely of outside directors. We 
focus on independent audit committees because we want to examine quality differences among 
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independent audit committees resulting from the tenure of outside directors. Based on the information 
of audit committee membership and director affiliations provided by IRRC, we identify a raw sample 
of 8,820 firm-year observations with independent audit committees from the population of 12,968 
firms over the period 1998 to 2005. The IRRC determination of affiliated directors (i.e., not 
independent directors) is that “IRRC generally considers any director affiliated who is a former 
employee; is an employee of or is a service provider, supplier, customer; is a recipient of charitable 
funds; is considered an interlocking or designated director; or is a family member of a director or 
executive”. The IRRC determination is close to the determinations of affiliated directors in U.S. stock 
exchanges’ codes including NYSE Corporate Governance 303A.05, NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and 
AMEX Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules Sec 805 that became effective in later 2003. We use 
1998 to 2005 as the sample period for tests because 1998 is the first year for which the IRRC provides 
audit committee membership data and 2005 is the latest data year of that version of IRRC Directors’ 
database. We collect the data of directors’ board service time, shareholding, audit committee size, and 
board independence from IRRC Directors. We also collect the data from Compustat database to 
compute financial variables. After excluding the observations with missing data, we reduce the sample 
size to 7,700 firm-year observations over the period 1998 to 2005. 
 
Table 1: Sample Breakdown 
 
Panel A. By year 
Year Frequency Percent (%) 
1998 802 10.42 
1999 834 10.83 
2000 929 12.06 
2001 1,066 13.84 
2002 903 11.73 
2003 1,000 12.99 
2004 1,076 13.97 
2005 1,090 14.16 
Total 7,700 100.00 
 
Panel B. By industry 
Industry Frequency Percent (%) 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 13 0.17 
Mining 298 3.87 
Construction 80 1.04 
Manufacturing 3,760 48.83 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 923 11.99 
Wholesale Trade 287 3.73 
Retail Trade 654 8.49 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 482 6.26 
Services 1,184 15.38 
Public Administration 19 0.25 
Total 7,700 100.00 
 
Table 1, panel A presents that the sample observations are evenly distributed over years. Table 
2, panel B reports the distribution of the observations across industries. I find that the manufacturing 
(48.8%), services (15.4%), transportation, communication, electric, gas, and sanitary services (12.0%), 
retail trade (8.5%), and finance, insurance, and real estate (6.3%) are the most widely represented 
industries in the sample. We find the similar results if the observations in finance industry are 
excluded. 
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4.2. Measurement of Earnings Management 
Discretionary accruals are commonly used to examine earnings management in the literature. Like 
prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Chung and Kallapur, 2003), this study measures earnings 
management based on discretionary accruals. First, we estimate a cross-sectional variant of the Jones 
(1991) model using observations in each two-digit SIC industry-year: 
ACC/TA
-1 = a0 1/TA-1 + a1 ∆SALES/TA-1 + a2 PPE/TA-1 + e (1) 
where 
ACC = total accruals measured as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations and cash from operations, 
TA
-1 = total assets at the beginning of the year, 
∆SALES = change in sales between year t-1 and year t, 
PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment. 
Like Klein (2002a), we use all firm-year observations on Compustat over the period 1998 to 
2005 and estimate the parameters in equation (1) for each two-digit SIC industry-year in which there 
are at least eight firms. Discretionary accruals for the sample observations are estimated as the residual 
values from model (1). 
Second, we adjust estimated discretionary accruals by controlling for the impact of 
performance on the estimates. Following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005), we match each firm-year 
observation in the sample with a firm-year observation from the population with the same two-digit 
SIC industry-year and the closest return on assets (ROA). The performance-matched discretionary 
accrual for each sample observation is computed as the discretionary accrual of the observation minus 
the discretionary accrual of the matched observation. We use the performance-matched approach to 
adjust discretionary accruals because Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) show that the performance-
matched discretionary accruals are less misspecified than other measures of discretionary accruals. 
Finally, the absolute value of the performance-matched discretionary accruals is used to 
measure earnings management. Like prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Chung and Kallapur, 2003), we 
take the absolute value for the measurement as the management manipulates earnings downward as 
well as upward (Levitt, 1998). 
 
4.3. Regression Model 
We estimate the following regression model to test the hypotheses: 
ADAC = β0 + β1LTNDIR + β2BLKDIR + β3ACMSIZE + β4BODIND + β5MB + β6ACNI + 
β7DEBT + β8SIZE + β9NEGNI + Year Dummies + ε (2) 
where 
ADAC = the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals based on the Jones 
model, 
LTNDIR = the proportion of long tenure directors on the independent audit committee, where long 
tenure directors are directors with the board tenure of 10 or more years, 
BLKDIR = the proportion of block shareholding directors on the independent audit committee, 
where block shareholding directors are directors who hold 5% or more of the firm’s 
common equity, 
ACMSIZE = audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit committee, 
BODIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors on the board, 
MB = the market-to-book ratio, measured by the ratio of the market value of the common 
equity to the book value of the common equity, 
ACNI = the absolute value of the change in net income between year t-1 and year t, deflated by 
the total assets, 
DEBT = the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
SIZE = the log of total assets, 
NEGNI = a dummy coded 1 if net income is negative for both year t-1 and year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
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We define long tenure directors by using 10 years of board service time as the cut-off point 
because this level is close to the average tenure of directors on the audit committee. BLKDIR is 
included in model (2) because directors with high stock ownership may have stronger incentives to 
monitor the management (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Moreover, Klein (2002a) documents some 
evidence that an outside block shareholder sitting on the audit committee can constrain earnings 
management. We add audit committee size (ACMSIZE) to model (2) as previous studies on board size 
suggest that audit committee size may affect audit committee effectiveness. For instance, Bushman, 
Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) argue that smaller size boards have the disadvantage of fewer advisors 
and monitors of management. Agrawal and Knoeber (1999) advocate larger size boards in firms where 
information is otherwise difficult to obtain. These studies suggest that larger audit committees could be 
more effective. It is also probably more difficult for managers to exert influence over a large 
committee. On the other hand, Jensen (1993) argues that in the context of boards of directors, larger 
boards can be ineffective because of higher cooperation costs and more free riding, suggesting that 
larger audit committees could be less effective. We control for the effect of board governance on audit 
committee effectiveness by including board independence (BODIND) in model (2). Board 
independence is commonly used as a measure of board governance quality in the literature (e.g., Klein, 
2002b; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007). 
We also include several additional variables in model (2) to control for the factors that may 
affect the absolute value of discretionary accruals or audit committee effectiveness. We include MB 
because Klein (2002b) provides evidence that audit committee independence is related to the market-
to-book ratio and Skinner and Sloan (2002) suggest that growth firms, proxied by high market-to-book 
ratio, are more likely to manage earnings. We include ACNI and DEBT because previous studies (e.g., 
Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney, 1996; Klein, 2002a) find that those variables are positively associated with 
earnings management. We include SIZE because political costs, proxied by firm size, are negatively 
associated with earnings management (Cahan, 2002). Furthermore, Klein (2002b) shows that firm size 
and negative earnings dummy (NEGNI) affect audit committee independence. Thus, we also include 
NEGNI. Finally, we include year dummies in model (2) to control for fixed year effects. 
We estimate model (2) on pooled cross-sectional, time series data. We expect a negative 
(positive) and significant coefficient for β1 if H1 (H2) is supported. In addition, we expect a negative 
coefficient for β2, β3, β4, and β8, and a positive coefficient for β5, β6, β7, and β9. 
 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the tenure characteristics of directors on the independent audit committees. The average 
tenure of outside directors is 9.54 years. 35.41% of the outside directors have at least 10 years’ board 
service time. 9.37% of the outside directors have at least 20 years’ board service time. 
 
Table 2: Tenure Characteristics of Independent Directors 
 
Total number of independent director-year observations 27,343 
Average tenure of independent directors (years) 9.54 
Percent of directors with 10 or more years' tenure  35.41% 
Percent of directors with 20 or more years' tenure  9.37% 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of variables. The mean and median of the absolute 
value of performance-matched discretionary accruals (ADAC) are 0.098 and 0.062, respectively. The 
average proportion of long tenure directors (with board service time of at least 10 years) on the audit 
committee is 27.3%. The average proportion of block shareholding directors (with the shareholding of 
at least 5% of the common equity) is 0.5%. The average audit committee size is 3.55 members. The 
average proportion of independent directors on the board is 70.4% for firms with the independent audit 
committee. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 
ADAC 7,700 0.098 0.062 0.109 0.028 0.125 
LTNDIR 7,700 0.273 0.250 0.283 0.000 0.500 
BLKDIR 7,700 0.005 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 
ACMSIZE 7,700 3.550 3.000 1.086 3.000 4.000 
BODIND 7,700 0.704 0.727 0.150 0.600 0.833 
MB 7,700 3.102 2.164 3.469 1.452 3.593 
ACNI 7,700 0.052 0.023 0.085 0.009 0.055 
DEBT 7,700 0.196 0.185 0.166 0.034 0.307 
SIZE 7,700 7.429 7.271 1.531 6.302 8.383 
NEGNI 7,700 0.094 0.000 0.291 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 4 provides the Pearson correlations between independent variables. The correlation 
coefficient between LTNDIR and BODIND is significantly negative, suggesting that long tenure 
directors on the audit committee may substitute to board governance. The negative correlations of 
LTNDIR with MB, DEBT, and NEGNI suggest that long tenure directors are less likely to sit on the 
audit committee of firms with high growth, high financial leverage, or negative earnings. The 
maximum absolute value among the correlation coefficients is 0.38 between ACMSIZE and BODIND. 
Since the correlations between the independent variables are not excessive, multicollinearity is unlikely 
to be a substantive issue. 
 
Table 4: Pearson Correlations (N=7,700) 
 
Variable BLKDIR ACMSIZE BODIND MB ACNI DEBT SIZE NEGNI 
LTNDIR 0.004 0.007 -0.059*** -0.042*** -0.081*** -0.028** -0.004 -0.033*** 
BLKDIR  -0.045*** -0.025** 0.016 0.043*** -0.008 -0.089*** 0.038*** 
ACMSIZE   0.379*** -0.008 -0.175*** 0.085*** 0.377*** -0.112*** 
BODIND    0.010 -0.061*** 0.066*** 0.185*** -0.024** 
MB     0.093*** -0.082*** 0.008 -0.066*** 
ACNI      -0.058*** -0.226*** 0.288*** 
DEBT       0.238*** 0.079*** 
SIZE        -0.154*** 
Notes: *** and ** indicate a significance at the level of 1%, and 5%, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
 
Table 5 contains the results of the regression that examines the effect of director tenure on the 
effectiveness of the independent audit committee in constraining earnings management. We find a 
negative and significant coefficient for LTNDIR (t-statistic = -3.48), consistent (inconsistent) with H1 
(H2). Thus, the independent audit committee with high proportion of long tenure directors is more 
effective in constraining earnings management than that with a low proportion of long tenure directors. 
This suggests that the expertise side of long director tenure overwhelmingly dominates its management 
friendliness side at the level of audit committee governance. These results are consistent with those in 
the Beasley (1996)’s study that the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases as outside director 
tenure on the board increases. On the other hand, my results are inconsistent with the Vafeas (2003)’s 
argument that long tenure directors are more affiliated and then less effective. 
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Table 5: Effect of Director Tenure on Independent Audit Committee Effectiveness 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.115 13.08*** 
LTNDIR - / + -0.015 -3.48*** 
BLKDIR - 0.036 1.25 
ACMSIZE - -0.003 -2.66*** 
BODIND - -0.001 -0.08 
MB + 0.002 6.89*** 
ACNI + 0.284 18.86*** 
DEBT + -0.030 -4.00*** 
SIZE - -0.004 -4.03*** 
NEGNI + 0.037 8.44*** 
N   7,700 
F-statistic   58.49*** 
Adj. R2   10.67% 
Notes: *** indicates a significance at the level of 1% (two-tailed tests). 
 
In Table 5, we also find a negative and significant coefficient for ACMSIZE, suggesting that 
large audit committees are more effective in constraining earnings management. Consistent with 
previous studies (e.g., Klein, 2002a), we find that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
positively associated with MB, ACNI, or NEGNI, and negatively associated with SIZE. Thus, firms 
with high growth, high change in earnings, or negative earnings are more likely to manage earnings, 
whereas large firms are less likely to engage in earnings management. However, we find a negative 
coefficient for DEBT, which is inconsistent with the Klein (2002a) findings that high financial leverage 
firms are more likely to manipulate earnings. 
We also conduct several additional analyses as follows. First, we examine whether the results 
are sensitive to using discretionary accruals computed by the following modified Jones model 
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995): 
ACC/TA
-1 = a0 1/TA-1 + a1 (∆SALES – ∆REC) /TA-1 + a2 PPE/TA-1 + e (3) 
where 
∆REC = change in receivables between year t-1 and year t. 
The Jones model is modified by adjusting the change in sales revenue for the change in account 
receivables as if the change in account receivables arises from earnings management. Table 6 reports 
the results when we use the performance-matched discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones 
model. We still find a negative and significant coefficient for LTNDIR (t-statistic = - 3.26). Likewise, 
the results support H1 but not H2. 
 
Table 6: Results Based on the Modified Jones Model 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.119 12.77*** 
LTNDIR - / + -0.014 -3.26*** 
BLKDIR - 0.026 0.90 
ACMSIZE - -0.003 -2.11** 
BODIND - -0.012 -1.29 
MB + 0.002 6.37*** 
ACNI + 0.294 18.84*** 
DEBT + -0.029 -3.59*** 
SIZE - -0.003 -3.51*** 
NEGNI + 0.039 8.60*** 
N   7,442 
F-statistic   57.40*** 
Adj. R2   10.82% 
Notes: *** and ** indicate a significance at the level of 1% and 5%, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 7: Results on An Alternative Measure of Long Tenure Director 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.112 12.86*** 
LTNDIR -/ + -0.023 -2.71*** 
BLKDIR - 0.037 1.29 
ACMSIZE - -0.003 -2.67*** 
BODIND - 0.000 0.03 
MB + 0.002 6.91*** 
ACNI + 0.285 18.98*** 
DEBT + -0.030 -3.94*** 
SIZE - -0.004 -4.06*** 
NEGNI + 0.036 8.41*** 
N   7,700 
F-statistic   58.15*** 
Adj. R2   10.62% 
Notes: *** indicates a significance at the level of 1% (two-tailed tests). 
 
Second, the documented dominance of long tenure directors’ expertise over their amiable 
relationships with the management could be due to the shorter cut-off point of 10 years used to identify 
long tenure directors. As the cut-off point of long tenure moves up, it is likely that the management 
friendliness side of long tenure directors may dominate its expertise side. This is because the expertise 
of long tenure directors may be a learning curve of director tenure (Katz, 1982). To mitigate this 
concern, we retest the hypotheses by increasing the cut-off point. Like Vafeas (2003), we define long 
tenure directors as those who served the board for 20 or more years. Table 7 presents evidence that the 
coefficient on LTNDIR is negative and significant (t-statistic = -2.71) when the cut-off point for long 
director tenure is increased to 20 years of board service time. These results suggest that the dominance 
of long tenure directors’ expertise is still evident. 
Third, some audit committee or board structure metrics in model (2) may be endogenous. Since 
this study focuses on director tenure, we test the hypotheses again by allowing for the endogeneity of 
director tenure. We re-estimate model (2) using a two-stage regression procedure similar to a procedure 
used by Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006). The first-stage regression involves modelling the 
determinants of the proportion of long tenure directors on the audit committee (i.e., LTNDIR). Based 
on prior research on the determinants of audit committee composition (e.g., Klein, 2002b), we include 
the market-to-book ratio, firm size, negative earnings dummy, and board independence in the first-
stage regression. We also include the portfolio rank of LTNDIR (i.e., LTNDIR_RANK) in the first-stage 
model. We add LTNDIR_RANK in the first-stage model because endogeneity is likely to affect the 
variation in LTNDIR rather than the level of LTNDIR (e.g., Greene, 2000). Hentschel and Kothari 
(2001) note that a relatively crude measure of the endogenous variable can be used as an instrumental 
variable because it is likely to capture the level of the variable but not the endogenously determined 
variations around those levels. We rank firm-year observations by LTNDIR and then categorize them 
into three equal-sized portfolios. LTNDIR_RANK is measured by 0, 1 or 2 for firms in the lowest, 
middle or highest portfolio, respectively. Thus, we model the determinants of long tenure directors as 
follows: 
LTNDIR = µ0 + µ1MB +µ2SIZE +µ3NEGNI+ µ4BODIND +µ5LTNDIR_RANK + e (Model 4) 
After estimating model (4), the second stage regression (i.e., model (2)) is run using the fitted 
value of LTNDIR from model (4). Table 8 reports the results after controlling for the endogeneity of 
director tenure. We still find that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is negatively associated 
with the proportion of long tenure directors on the audit committee (t-statistic = -3.21), consistent with 
H1. 
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Table 8: Results after Allowing for Endogeneity 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.115 13.04*** 
LTMDIR - -0.015 -3.21*** 
BLKDIR - 0.036 1.25 
ACMSIZE - -0.003 -2.36** 
BODIND - -0.002 -0.18 
MB + 0.002 6.88*** 
ACNI + 0.285 18.93*** 
DEBT + -0.030 -3.97*** 
SIZE - -0.004 -4.10*** 
NEGNI + 0.037 8.44*** 
N   7,700 
F-statistic   58.36*** 
Adj. R2   10.65% 
Notes: *** and ** indicate a significance at the level of 1% and 5%, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
 
Fourth, we examine whether the results hold after two more audit committee structure metrics, 
i.e., the proportion of directors who have at least three board seats of other firms and the proportion of 
directors who are the CEO of other firms, are added in equation (2). Like long tenure directors, 
directors with more additional directorships and directors with CEO title may have greater expertise. 
Directors who serve on many boards have reputations as effective monitors (Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999). Previous studies (e.g., Shivdasani, 1993; Brickley, Linck, and Coles, 1999; Coles and Hoi, 
2003) provide evidence that directors with more board seats are more effective. Similarly, CEO 
directors may have more experience and knowledge about business operations. 
Also like long tenure directors, directors with more additional directorships and directors with 
CEO title may be less effective. Directors with more additional directorships are too busy to monitor 
the management. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that those 
directors have lower monitoring effectiveness. Since CEOs are a relatively homogenous, cohesive 
collection of individuals (e.g., Useem, 1984), the presence of CEOs from other firms on the audit 
committee may result in a general propensity to support the CEO when deciding on accounting 
treatments (e.g., Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton, 1998). Thus, CEO 
directors may be less likely to preclude earnings management. 
We re-run model (2) by including the two audit committee metrics, i.e., the proportion of 
directors with more additional directorships and the proportion of CEO directors. Untabulated results 
show that the coefficient is still negative and significant for LTNDIR, but insignificant for the two 
added variables. These results suggest that the effect of LTNDIR dominates the effect of the two added 
metrics that may reflect a certain extent of directors’ expertise. 
Fifth, we examine whether long tenure directors are equally effective in constraining both 
upward and downward earnings management. We use signed discretionary accruals as the dependent 
variable in model (2) and run the regression separately for observations with positive or negative 
discretionary accruals. Of 7,700 firm-year observations, 3,454 and 4,246 observations have positive 
and negative performance-matched discretionary accruals, respectively, suggesting that “cookie-jar 
accounting” is pervasive in practice (Levitt, 1998). We find that the coefficient on LTNDIR is negative 
but insignificant when earnings are manipulated upward, whereas the coefficient on LTNDIR is 
positive and significant when earnings are manipulated downward. Thus, firms manage earnings less 
downward if they have more long-term directors sitting on the audit committee. 
Finally, we estimate model (2) using yearly observations from 1998 to 2005 to control for the 
potential autocorrelations of time-series data. We find that the coefficient on LTNDIR is negative for 
seven of the eight annual regressions, of which the coefficient is significant for four regressions. 
Overall, these results are consistent with H1 rather than H2. 
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6.  Conclusion 
This study examines whether board tenure of directors on the independent audit committee affects the 
effectiveness of the committee in constraining earnings management. We document strong evidence 
that the proportion of long tenure directors on the independent audit committee is negatively associated 
with earnings management, suggesting that independent audit committee members with long board 
tenure have greater expertise and experience to effectively oversee financial reporting. Our results are 
robust to various sensitivity tests. This study provides the following contributions to the literature. 
First, this study adds to the literature by considering board tenure of directors on the independent audit 
committee. Focusing on independent audit committees is of practical value. Second, this study employs 
a larger size sample over a longer period than other studies on audit committees. We document more 
convincing evidence that director tenure affects audit committee effectiveness. 
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